Posts Tagged ‘Iraq’

Dead Aid?

August 31, 2010 Leave a comment

The national security council has said the ODA [Overseas Development Administration] budget should make the maximum possible contribution to national security consistent with ODA rules. Although the NSC will not in most cases direct DfID spend in country, we need to be able to make the case for how our work contributes to national security.”DFID document

Documents leaked from DFID over the past couple of weeks hint at a significant shift in the future direction of  Britain’s overseas development policy; a reorientation that cannot be viewed with optimism.

After Left Foot Forward initially received a leaked ‘submission to Ministers’ from DFID’s Director of Policy, Nick Dyer, on August 12, the story has continued to run until the Guardian decided to publish a similar story on August 29. Whilst the former discussed recommendations for which projects could be abandoned (and was intended, obviously, for Ministers), the latter covered DFID’s directive to the ODA that security considerations (and the NSC) should be utmost when justifying aid expenditure. The UK government, and in particular DFID, are not exactly flattered by these latest developments. The most pressing concerns for the UK’s forthcoming overseas development policy appear to be issues of national security and stakeholder interests. Apparently, this constitutes part of the reappraisal of how aid should be applied. The Tories would like aid to be measured by outputs and outcomes rather than inputs, which is an admirable intention however unfeasible that ultimately may prove. Unfortunately it can be used as a smokescreen for removing support for numerous important initiatives, raises the prospect of short-term gains being favoured over those occurring over a more extensive period of time, and is conducive to facilitating the increased securitisation of the UK’s overseas development programme.

Conflating concerns over national security with overseas development assistance is hardly a new phenomenon – much of the Marshall Plan was governed by similar issues – yet it’s increasing prevalence is in contrast to the dominant liberal orientation of international relations in the post-Cold War context. Liberalism, and therefore humanitarian intervention, has endured repeated attacks from both Right and Left. The Right have long argued that self-interest must govern foreign policy whilst the rise of post-structuralism on the Left has questioned the long-assumed moral superiority of the West. Technological development, and the attendant growth in public access to information, has fundamentally damaged the image of the West, and the US in particular, as the guardian of progressive, democratic values. There is no moral authority when the US attacks Afghanistan and Iraq or when Israel commits its regular atrocities, and global sentiment has become resolutely anti-American (although Obama has alleviated this to a certain extent). Put simply, there now exists a choice between supporting a truly altruistic aid agenda (where we expect little in return) or one based on overbearing conditionalities. It’s clear that the UK has chosen the latter. Given the present state of most Western economies, and the increasingly multipolar nature of global politics, this is hardly surprising.

Iraq and Afghanistan were both major recipients of DFID expenditure over the past decade (although Iraq was not in the top 15 for 2008/2009 – see figure 1), yet the trend has been for aid to largely go to where it is needed (or to former British colonies). Much of

figure 1

the aid directed to Iraq and Afghanistan was aimed at the amelioration of the fragile security situation in the two states (and ultimately British national security interests). Whilst this is understandable in the context of post-conflict reconstruction there are two key problems with the approach. Foremost is the issue of an aid imbalance – the vast majority of aid to Afghanistan from global sources has been targeted at security concerns, ignoring myriad other areas that would perhaps benefit more readily from aid spending, such as health and education. The lack of support for key areas of Afghan development might not prove particularly significant given the precipice that the country appears to be falling into, but propping up Karzai’s completely discredited and rotten regime (and its equally corrupt military) is rapidly becoming a disaster. The haste with which NATO appears to preparing to exit the country merely reinforces the notion that this is not a humanitarian intervention. The second important issues relates to the wider application of the use of aid for protecting issues of national security. In war zones there is an arguable necessity in directing aid towards a nation’s security capacity; what will happen in those states where the same principles do not apply? There is clearly the potential for a reappraisal of which nations will be useful recipients of DFID’s aid programme – those nations that are unlikely to contain threats to British national security could potentially see their aid cut. This would include much of Sub-Saharan Africa with the clear exception of Somalia. The region includes many of the world’s poorest nations; those that are dependent upon foreign aid (albeit with this having debatable consequences.) Somalia would be a prime target for a move towards an aid agenda driven by national security concerns, yet the state’s (used in the loosest term possible) incredibly unstable nature will most probably dissuade the West from any significant intervention. DFID’s future direction may be to move away from the more holistic approach it has taken in recent years to one guided by self-interest. Not only is this at odds with some of the guiding principles of aid provision, it is unlikely to prove especially successful.

Aid is fundamentally altruistic. There exists a clear requirement to monitor the return upon the provision of aid, but this should be made on the basis of how it alleviates the suffering of those most in need. By placing issues of national security as the primary concern, the return upon aid provision has the potential to be measured in misguided terms. Aid related to the development of a nation’s health and education provision has repeatedly proven itself to be integral to a state’s progress. In the wider context of development models, investment in human capital and education have often been ultimately conducive to particularly fast rates of economic growth. Health and education are not usually central to a nation’s security concerns however. Through directing aid to other avenues, some of the world’s poorest individuals may become increasingly vulnerable as a consequence of DFID’s future aid policy. Not only may health and education programmes endure a shortfall from redirected aid spending but perverse incentives to actually undermine positive development approaches could yet arise. Investment in education creates possible conflict with national security concerns. Suppose aid earmarked for education encourages the establishment of Madrassas that ultimately encourage the radicalisation of a number of individuals. Perhaps investment in communications infrastructure will increase exposure to radical thought via the internet. On a particularly basic level, encouraging individuals to unite on a daily basis in one particular place (as education provision does) will lead to an exchange and consolidation of ideas antithetical to Western principles. This blog doesn’t believe that these processes will happen, yet this line of thought could be used as justification for DFID to restructure aid provision.

The most alarming outcome would be for the aid imbalance to overwhelmingly favour investment in a nation’s security and military capabilities at the expense of institution and basic infrastructure building. An increasingly militaristic state will always be vulnerable to a potential Coup d’état and, consequently, the establishment of an extremely powerful military dictatorship with little credible opposition. Should this new hypothetical regime support the UK’s national security interests would this be viewed as a satisfactory outcome? There really isn’t a significant difference between this and the disgraceful Reagan doctrine. It would be completely opposed to the humanitarian principles upon which the provision of aid is founded.

The realignment of DFID’s aid policy is in keeping with many of the wider changes the Conservative-dominated UK government wishes to implement. Although the pledge to retain overseas aid spending at 0.7% of GNI by 2013 is to be applauded, it has come at a cost. Under the guise of efficiency savings, DFID will cut a third of its present workforce in East Kilbride and abandon the majority of the near-100 aid-related pledges that were established under Labour. This is a somewhat mystifying decision given the proclaimed move towards an output-based approach to assessing overseas aid requirements. By removing established targets what are the ultimate aims of DFID’s aid programme? Using the ringfencing of DFID’s budget as justification for a pejorative shift in policy direction is embarrassing for the UK as a whole, and worrying for many smaller NGOs that are reliant upon DFID’s present investment choices. It’s another neoliberal answer that nobody needs. As if the British people weren’t going to suffer enough from a government with an ideological basis that has never worked, DFID’s aid revisions will ensure that this suffering is exported to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations.